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Abstract
The work presents a new method for the design of ideal
secret sharing. The method uses regular mappings that
are well suited for construction of perfect secret sharing.
The restriction of regular mappings to permutations gives
a convenient tool for investigation of the relation between
permutations and ideal secret sharing generated by them.
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1 Introduction
Secret sharing allows a group of participants to collec-
tively hold a secret. The secret is typically divided into
shares and each participant has at least one share of the
secret. Secret sharing is useful to protect secrets against
a loss of the shares caused by unreliable storage but also
can be used to enable a group to own secrets. The group
ownership of a secret is of a great interest to cryptography
as it can be used to handle cryptographic operations by
groups rather than individuals.
There are many constructions of secret sharing
schemes. The most prominent ones include the Shamir
scheme [11] and Blakley schemes [2, 11]. These two con-
structions allow any group of n participants to share se-
cret in such a way that any t (t ≤ n) or more participants
are able to recover jointly the secret (they are also called
(t, n) threshold schemes). Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki gave a
construction of perfect secret sharing for arbitrary mono-
tone access structure [9]. An alternative construction of
perfect secret sharing was given by Benaloh and Leichter
[1].
Perfect secret sharing requires that any collection of
participants not belonging to the access structure gains
no information about the secret while any collection of
participants from the access structure is able to recover
the secret. Perfect secret sharing with shares of the same
length as the secret is called ideal. Ideal secret sharing
are of special practical interest as the storage of shares
is the smallest possible. The best known construction of
ideal secret sharing by Brickell [3] generalises the Shamir
approach.
Secret sharing is originally defined on a finite field how-
ever it can be considered in a finite Abelian group so as
to define black-box secret sharing [6, 7, 8].
In this work we give a new construction of ideal secret
sharing. The construction is based on regular mappings.
A mapping F from GF (q)t to GF (q)m is regular if F
takes each vector GF (q)m precisely qt−m times. Clearly,
a regular mapping exists only when t ≥ m. We are going
to show that regular mappings provide perfectness when
used to secret sharing construction. Moreover, as per-
mutations are regular mappings for t = m, they generate
ideal secret sharing. The work describes a new framework
for the design of ideal secret sharing that can be seen as
a generalisation of Brickell’s approach [3].
The paper is structured as follows. The basic concepts
of secret sharing are introduced in Section 2. Regular
mappings and their properties are studied in Section 3.
Section 4 explores properties of regular mappings in the
context of the perfect and ideal secret sharing. In Section
5, we show a method to identify the coordinate functions
of a permutation so that we can construct ideal secret
sharing schemes. In Section 6, we extend the construction
so as to obtain more ideal secret sharing schemes from a
known one. Conclusions close the work.
2 Access Structures and Secret
Sharing
A secret sharing scheme is a method to share a secret
among a set of participants P = {P1, . . . , Pn}. Let K de-
note the set of secrets and S denote the set of shares. The
secret sharing has two algorithms: distribution algorithm
(dealer) and recovery algorithm (combiner). The dealer
assigns shares s1, . . . , sn to the participants P1, . . . , Pn,
respectively. At the recovery stage, we assume that a
collection of ` participants Pj1 , . . . , Pj` is currently active
and they send their shares sj1 , . . . , sj` to the combiner.
The combiner takes the submitted shares sj1 , . . . , sj` and
computes a secret. The secret is recovered if and only if
{Pj1 , . . . , Pj`} is a qualified subset of P.
All qualified subsets of P create the access structure Γ.
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An access structure Γ is said to be monotone
if A ∈ Γ and A ⊆ B ⊆ P then B ∈ Γ.
We can describe the secret sharing scheme with the
access structure Γ by an m × (n + 1) matrix M∗, as in-
troduced in [4, 5]. The matrix M∗ has n + 1 columns
indexed by 0, 1. . . . , n. The value of m or the number of
rows in M∗ depends on the particular access structure Γ.
We index the rows of the matrix M∗ by 1, . . . ,m. For a
fixed i-th row of M∗, the entry on the 0-th position is the
secret, and the i-th entry in the row shows the share si
that is assigned to the participant Pi (i = 1, . . . , n). Let
us denote the entry of the i-th row and the j-th column
of M∗ by M∗(i, j). The matrix M∗ is called a defining
matrix of the secret sharing scheme with access scheme Γ.
The matrix M obtained from M∗ by removing the 0-th
column is called the associated matrix of the scheme.
The dealer constructs the secret sharing by designing
the defining matrix and choosing at random a row of the
matrix M∗. Let it be the i0-th row. The shares M
∗(i0, j)
are distributed to the corresponding participants Pj , j =
1, . . . , n, and the secret is M∗(i0, 0).
A access structure Γ = {A | #A ≥ t} is called a (t, n)-
threshold access structure, where #A denotes the number
of elements in the set A and t is an integer with 0 <
t ≤ n. A secret sharing scheme with a (t, n)- threshold
access structure is called a (t, n)-threshold scheme. The
parameter t is called the threshold.
Secret sharing is identified by its defining matrix.
Clearly, permuting the rows of a defining matrix of a se-
cret sharing scheme does not give a new scheme as the
resulting matrix contains the same collection of rows. Per-
muting the columns of an associated matrix of secret shar-
ing is equivalent to changing the indices of participants.
Given a secret sharing with the access structure Γ. We
say that the secret scheme is perfect if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
1) IfA ∈ Γ then the participants inA recover the secret.
2) If A 6∈ Γ then the participants from A cannot recover
any information about the secret (in an information
theoretic sense).
As mentioned in [4], we can use the matrix M∗ to ex-
press Conditions (1) and (2) more precisely as follows.
(a) Let A ∈ Γ. If M∗(i, j) = M∗(i′, j) for every Pj ∈
A then M∗(i, 0) = M∗(i′, 0). The secret must be
uniquely determined by the shares of qualified subset
A ∈ Γ.
(b) Let A 6∈ Γ. For any integer 1 ≤ i0 ≤ m and any
K ∈ K there exists some integer i with 1 ≤ i ≤
m such that M∗(i, j) = M∗(i0, j) for all Pj ∈ A
and M∗(i, 0) = K. The collection of shares of A
matches many rows whose secrets run through all
possible values of K.
(b’) Let A = {Pj1 , . . . , Pj`} 6∈ Γ. For any sj1 , . . . , sj` ∈
S and any K ∈ K, #{i | M∗(i, ju) =
sju for all Pju ∈ A and M
∗(i, 0) = K} is indepen-
dent of the choice of K. The unauthorised subset
A knows nothing about the secret.
It is easy to verify that (b’) implies (b). The secret
sharing scheme satisfying (a) and (b) is called weakly per-
fect, while it is called perfect if it satisfies (a) and (b’)
[4]. It is known [5] that #K ≤ #S for perfect secret shar-
ing. In particular, if #K = #S, the perfect secret sharing
scheme is called ideal.
Let Γ be an access structure. A ∈ Γ is called minimal
if any proper subset of A is not included in Γ. Clearly, Γ
is uniquely determined by its minimal elements. Thus, to
define an access structure Γ, it is sufficient to define all
minimal elements of Γ. In particular, for a (t, n)-threshold
scheme, clearly a subset of participants is minimal element
if and only if it contains precisely t participants.
3 Regular Mappings
Let q = pv where p is a prime number and v is a positive
integer. We write GF (q) or GF (pv) to denote the finite
field of q = pv elements, and GF (q)t or GF (pv)t to de-
note the vector space of t tuples of elements from GF (q).
Note that each vector α ∈ GF (q)t can be expressed as
α = (a1, . . . , at) where a1, . . . , at ∈ GF (q). The integer
a1q
t−1 + · · · + at−1q + at is called the integer represen-
tation of vector α = (a1, . . . , at), where each aj and the
sum are real-valued. Thus we can index all the qt vectors
in GF (q)t:
α0, α1, . . . , αqt−1
where j is the integer representation of αj .
A mapping F from GF (q)t to GF (q)m (t ≥ m) is said
to be regular if F takes each vector in GF (q)m precisely
qt−m times. Clearly in this case t ≥ m. In particular,
a regular mapping from GF (q)t to GF (q)t is exactly a
permutation on GF (q)t.
A function f on GF (q)t is a mapping from GF (q)t
to GF (q). The function f can be expressed as f(x) or
f(x1, . . . , xt), where x = (x1, . . . , xt) ∈ GF (q)
t. The truth
table of f is the sequence f(α0), f(α1), . . . , f(αqt−1). Reg-
ular functions are called balanced.
Note that there are precisely qq
t
functions on GF (q)t.
On the other hand, we consider polynomials that can be
expressed as
g(x1, . . . , xt) =
∑
ai1,...,itx
i1
1 · · ·x
it
t (1)
where each ai1,...,it ∈ GF (q), each ij satisfies 0 ≤ ij ≤ q−
1 as aq = a for any element α ∈ GF (q), and x0j is defend as
x0j = 1. It should be pointed out that x
q−1
j and x
0
j are not
identical. By definition, if ij = 0 then the term x
i1
1 · · ·x
it
t
does not contain xj . On the other hand, x
q−1
j = 0 when
xj = 0 although x
q−1
j = 1 when xj 6= 0. Since x
q−1
j
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and x0j are not identical, due to Equation (1), one can
verify that there are precisely qq
t
polynomials on GF (q)t.
Therefore each function on GF (q)t can be expressed as a
polynomial. This conclusion is useful in this work. If a
function f can be expressed as f(x1, . . . , xt) = c+ a1x1+
· · ·+atxt, then f is called an affine function. In particular,
an affine function f is called linear if c = 0. It is easy to
see that non-constant affine functions are balanced.
A mapping F from GF (q)t to GF (q)m (t ≥ m) can be
expressed as
F (x1, . . . , xt) = (f1(x1, . . . , xt), . . . , fm(x1, . . . , xt)) (2)
where each fj is a function on GF (q)
t, called the j-th
coordinate function of F .
The following statement is obvious.
Lemma 1 The mapping (2) is regular if and only if for
any integer k with 1 ≤ k ≤ m and any k coordinate func-
tions fi1 , . . . , fik , the mapping from GF (q)
t to GF (q)k,
G(x1, . . . , xt) = (fi1(x1, . . . , xt), . . . , fik(x1, . . . , xt))
is regular.
A characterisation of regular mappings can be found
in Corollary 7.39 of [10]:
Lemma 2 The mapping (2) is regular if and only if
any nonzero linear combination of f1, . . . , fm is balanced,
in other words, for any nonzero vector (c1, . . . , cm) ∈
GF (q)t, c1f1 + · · ·+ cmfm is balanced.
Lemma 3 The mapping (2) is regular if and only if for
any m ×m nonsingular matrix B over GF (q), the map-
ping
G(x1, . . . , xt) = (F (x1, . . . , xt))B
= (f1(x1, . . . , xt), . . . , fm(x1, . . . , xt))B
is a regular mapping from GF (q)t to GF (q)m.
Combining Lemmas 1 and 3, we have
Lemma 4 Let the mapping (2) be regular and g1, . . . , gk
be linear combinations of f1, . . . , fm. If g1, . . ., gk are
linearly independent then
H(x1, . . . , xt) = (g1(x1, . . . , xt), . . . , gk(x1, . . . , xt))
is a regular mapping from GF (q)t to GF (q)k.
4 Ideal Secret Sharing from Reg-
ular Mappings
Let F be a regular mapping from GF (q)t to GF (q)m (t ≥
m). Then F can be expressed as
F (x1, . . . , xt) = (f1(x1, . . . , xt), . . . , fm(x1, . . . , xt)),
where fj is the j-th coordinate function of F .
There precisely exist qm − 1 nonzero linear combina-
tions of f1, . . . , fm, denoted by g1, . . . , gqm−1. We set
<F = {g1, . . . , gqm−1}. (3)
Clearly, <F forms a m-dimensional space and then the
rank of <F is equal to m.
We now construct an ideal secret sharing scheme for n
participants, P1, . . . , Pn.
Dealer (distribution algorithm)
• The dealer chooses h0, h1, . . . , hn ∈ <F , not neces-
sarily distinct, and defines an access structure Γ such
that {Pj1 , . . . , Pj`} ∈ Γ if and only if there is a se-
quence c1, . . . , c` ∈ GF (q) such that
h0 = c1hj1 + · · ·+ c`hj` . (4)
• The defining matrix M∗ is created from hi; i =
0, . . . , n. The matrix has (n+1) columns and qt rows
whose entries are from GF (q), where n+1 ≤ qm−1.
The j-th column ηj of M
∗ is the truth table of hj ,
j = 0, 1, . . . , n.
• The dealer chooses at random a row of M∗. Let
the index of the row be i, 1 ≤ i ≤ qt. The secret
is M∗(i, 0) and the shares are M∗(i, 1), . . . ,M∗(i, n)
that are distributed via secure channel to the corre-
sponding participants. So Pj holds sj = M
∗(i, j);
j = 1, . . . , n.
Combiner (recovery algorithm)
• The combiner takes the defining matrix M∗ and col-
lects shares sent from a group of currently active par-
ticipants A = {Pj1 , . . . , Pj`}.
• All rows containing the submitted shares are marked.
When A ∈ Γ, the corresponding secret will be identi-
fied and returned to each participant in A. If A 6∈ Γ,
the marked rows contain secrets that are running
through all values of K and the combiner is not able
to determine the secret.
Lemma 5 The defining matrix M∗ of the secret sharing
with the access structure Γ, defined in (4), satisfies Con-
dition (a).
Proof. Let {Pj1 , . . . , Pj`} ∈ Γ. Assume thatM
∗(i, j1) =
M∗(i′, j1), . . ., M
∗(i, j`) = M
∗(i′, j`). Then h0 = c1hj1 +
· · · + c`hj` for some c1, . . . , c` ∈ GF (q), and then η0 =
c1ηj1+· · ·+c`ηj` . It follows thatM
∗(i, 0) = c1M
∗(i, j1)+
· · · + c`M
∗(i, j`) and M
∗(i′, 0) = c1M
∗(i′, j1) + · · · +
c`M
∗(i′, j`). We have proved that M
∗(i, 0) = M∗(i′, 0),
and thus M∗ satisfies Condition (a). 2
Lemma 6 The defining matrix M∗ of the secret sharing
with the access structure Γ, defined in (4), satisfies Con-
dition (b’).
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Proof. Let {Pj1 , . . . , Pj`} 6∈ Γ. Let M
∗
1 be the q
t × (`+
1) submatrix of M∗, comprised of ` + 1 columns of M∗,
indexed by 0, j1, . . ., j`. Similarly, let M1 be the q
t × `
submatrix of M∗, comprised of ` columns of M∗, indexed
by j1, . . ., j`.
For any K, s1, . . . , s` ∈ GF (q), there are the two fol-
lowing cases: (s1, . . . , s`) is a row vector of M1 and
(s1, . . . , s`) is not a row vector of M1.
Case 1: (s1, . . . , s`) is a row vector of M1. Then there
exists some α ∈ GF (q)t such that
hj1(α) = s1, . . . , hj`(α) = s`. (5)
Let r denote the rank of {hj1 , . . . , hj`}. For con-
veniences, without loss of generality, we assume that
{hj1 , . . . , hjr} is a basis of {hj1 , . . . , hj`}, i.e., hj1 , . . . , hjr
are linearly independent and each of hj1 , . . . , hj` can be
uniquely expressed as a linear combination of hj1 , . . . , hjr .
Set
H(x1, . . . , xt) = (hj1(x1, . . . , xt), . . . , hjr (x1, . . . , xt)).
Due to Lemma 4, H is a regular mapping from GF (q)t
to GF (q)r . Due to Lemma 1, we know that
hj1(α) = s1, . . . , hjr(α) = sr
has precisely qt−r solutions. Since each of hjr+1 , . . . , h`
can be uniquely expressed as a linear combination of
hj1 , . . . , hjr , we know that (5) has precisely q
t−r solutions.
On the other hand, recall that {Pj1 , . . . , Pj`} 6∈ Γ.
Thus h0 is not a linear combination of hj1 , . . . , hjr , and
thus h0, hj1 , . . . , hjr are linearly independent. Set
H∗(x1, . . . , xt) =
(h0(x1, . . . , xt), hj1(x1, . . . , xt), . . . , hjr (x1, . . . , xt))
Due to Lemma 4, H∗ is a regular mapping from GF (q)t
to GF (q)r+1. Due to Lemma 1, we know that
h0(α) = K,hj1(α) = s1, . . . , hjr (α) = sr
has precisely qt−r−1 solutions. Since each of hjr+1 , . . . , h`
can be uniquely expressed as a linear combination of
hj1 , . . . , hjr , we know that
h0(α) = K,hj1(α) = s1, . . . , hj`(α) = s`
has precisely qt−r−1 solutions. Note that qt−r−1 is inde-
pendent of the choice of K.
Case 2: (s1, . . . , s`) is not a row vector of M1. In this
case for any K ∈ GF (q), clearly (K, s1, . . . , s`) does not
appear inM∗1 as its a row vector no matter how to choose
K ∈ GF (q). So we have proved that Condition (b’) is
satisfied. 2
According to Lemmas 5 and 6, we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 Let F be a regular mapping from GF (q)t to
GF (q)m (t ≥ m). For any integer n with n+1 ≤ qm− 1,
the number of participants, and any n + 1 nonzero lin-
ear combinations h0, h1, . . . , hn of the coordinate func-
tions f1, . . . , fm of F :
1) The secret sharing scheme with the access structure
Γ, defined in (4), is perfect.
2) The matrix M∗ is a defining matrix of the perfect
secret sharing.
Furthermore, we state
Corollary 1 Let F be a regular mapping from GF (q)t to
GF (q)m (t ≥ m). For any integer n with n+1 ≤ qm− 1,
the number of participants, and any n+ 1 nonzero linear
combinations h0, h1, . . . , hn of the coordinate functions
f1, . . . , fm of F , the secret sharing scheme with the access
structure Γ, defined in (4), is ideal, and K = S = GF (q).
Proof. Due to Lemma 2, each column ofM∗ must contain
all elements in GF (q). This proves that K = S = GF (q).
2
From (4), we need to determine all the coordinate func-
tions of a given regular mapping so that we can construct
a secret sharing scheme.
5 Finding Coordinate Functions
of Permutations
When t = m, the regular mapping F from GF (q)t to
GF (q)m is a permutation on GF (q)t. As we have argued
in Section 4, a permutation on GF (q)t can be used to con-
struct ideal secret sharing schemes. We are going to focus
our attention on permutations rather than on general reg-
ular mappings as permutations are easy to construct.
From a permutation χ on GF (qt), we can define a
mapping F from GF (q)t to GF (q)t as follows. Let 
be a primitive element of degree t over GF (q). For any
(c1, . . . , ct) ∈ GF (q)
t, let γ = c1
t−1 + · · · + ct−1 + ct,
and let χ(γ) = d1
t−1 + · · · + dt−1 + dt. We define
F (c1, . . . , ct) = (d1, . . . , dt). Clearly the mapping F is
a permutation on GF (q)t. We call F the permutation
reduced by χ.
Example 1 Let q = 2, t = 3. Define a function on
GF (23) such that χ(γ) = γ3 for any γ ∈ GF (23). It is
easy to verify that χ is a permutation on GF (23). From
χ, we now define a permutation F on GF (2)3 as follows.
Let  be a root of the primitive polynomial x3 + x2+1. It
is easy to verify that
χ(0) = 0, χ(1) = 1,
χ() = 2 + 1, χ(+ 1) = ,
χ(2) = 2 + , χ(2 + 1) = 2,
χ(2 + ) = 2 + + 1, χ(2 + + 1) = + 1.
We then define a permutation F on GF (q)3 such that
F (0, 0, 0) = (0, 0, 0), F (0, 0, 1) = (0, 0, 1),
F (0, 1, 0) = (1, 0, 1), F (0, 1, 1) = (0, 1, 0),
F (1, 0, 0) = (1, 1, 0), F (1, 0, 1) = (1, 0, 0),
F (1, 1, 0) = (1, 1, 1), F (1, 1, 1) = (0, 1, 1).
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Set
F (x1, x2, x3) =
(f1(x1, x2, x3), f2(x1, x2, x3), f3(x1, x2, x3))
where fj is a function on GF (2)
3. Then we can determine
that
f1(x1, x2, x3) = x1 + x2 + x1x2 + x2x3,
f2(x1, x2, x3) = x1 + x1x3 + x2x3,
f3(x1, x2, x3) = x2 + x3 + x1x3.
Assume that the secret sharing scheme contains four
participants, P1, P2, P3, P4. We choose
h0 = f1, h1 = f2, h2 = f1 + f3,
h3 = f2 + f3, h4 = f1 + f2 + f3.
It is easy to verify that
B1 = {h3, h4}, B2 = {h1, h2, h3}
satisfy the following property that h0 is a linear combina-
tion of the functions in each Bj but h0 is not any linear
combination of functions in any proper subset of Bj. Ac-
cording to (4), we obtain an access structure Γ defined by
its minimal elements
A1 = {P3, P4}, A2 = {P1, P2, P3}.
For each α ∈ GF (2)3, h0(α) is the secret, h1(α), h2(α),
h3(α), and h4(α) are the shares for P1, P2, P3 and P4 re-
spectively. Due to Corollary 1, this secret sharing scheme
with the access structure Γ, is ideal.
Example 2 We consider a simple case of χ. Let χ be the
identity permutation on GF (34). Thus F (x1, x2, x3, x4) is
the identity permutation on GF (3)4. We define a secret
sharing scheme with seven participants, P1, P2, P3, P4,
P5, P6, P7, satisfying K = S = GF (3). We choose
h0(x) = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4, h1(x) = x1,
h2(x) = x2, h3(x) = x3,
h4(x) = x4, h5(x) = x1 + x2,
h6(x) = x1 + x4, h7(x) = x2 + x4
It is easy to verify that
B1 = {h1, h2, h3, h4}, B2 = {h1, h3, h5, h6},
B3 = {h2, h3, h5, h7}, B4 = {h3, h4, h6, h7},
B5 = {h3, h4, h5}, B6 = {h2, h3, h6},
B7 = {h1, h3, h7}
satisfy the following property that h0 is a linear combina-
tion of the functions in each Bj but h0 is not any linear
combination of functions in any proper subset of Bj. Due
to (4), we obtain an access structure Γ defined by its min-
imal elements:
A1 = {P1, P2, P3, P4}, A2 = {P1, P3, P5, P6},
A3 = {P2, P3, P5, P7}, A4 = {P3, P4, P6, P7},
A5 = {P3, P4, P5}, A6 = {P2, P3, P6},
A7 = {P1, P3, P7}
For any α ∈ GF (3)4, h0(α) is a secret, and each hj(α)
is the share for participant Pj, j = 1, . . . , 7. For exam-
ple, let α = (2, 1, 0, 2). Then the secret is K = 2, the
shares for P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7 are 2, 1, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0
respectively. Due to Corollary 1, we obtain an ideal secret
sharing scheme with the access structure Γ.
6 Extended Constructions
In this section, we construct other secret sharing schemes
from the one, constructed in Section 4.
Theorem 2 Let M∗ be a defining matrix of the secret
sharing scheme with the access structure Γ defined in (4).
For any integer j′ with 1 ≤ j′ ≤ n and any integer k with
1 ≤ k ≤ v − 1, where q = pv, we replace each entry c in
the j′-th column by cp
k
, where p is the characteristic of
GF (q), i.e., q = pv. Denote the resulting matrix by M∗∗.
Then M∗∗ is a defining matrix of an ideal secret sharing
scheme with the same access structure Γ.
Proof. Let P1, . . . , Pn be all the participants and Pj1 , . . .,
Pj` be all the currently active participants. Let M
∗
1 be a
qt × ` submatrix of M∗, comprised of ` columns of M∗,
indexed by j1, . . . , j`, where 1 ≤ j1 < · · · < j` ≤ n. We
now verify that M∗∗ satisfies Conditions (a) and (b’).
There two cases to be considered: j′ 6∈ {j1, . . . , j`} and
j′ ∈ {j1, . . . , j`}. For the first case: j
′ 6∈ {j1, . . . , j`},
clearly both (a) and (b’) are satisfied. We next consider
the second case: j′ ∈ {j1, . . . , j`}. Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that j′ = j`.
We first verify Condition (a). Let {j1, . . . , j`} ∈ Γ.
Assume that
M∗∗(i, j1) = M
∗∗(i′, j1), . . . ,M
∗∗(i, j`−1)
= M∗∗(i′, j`−1),
M∗∗(i, j`) = M
∗∗(i′, j`)
Then
M∗(i, j1) = M
∗(i′, j1), . . . ,M
∗(i, j`−1)
= M∗(i′, j`−1),
M∗∗(i, j`) = M
∗∗(i′, j`).
Note that M∗∗(i, j`) = (M
∗(i, j`))
pk and M∗∗(i′, j`) =
(M∗(i′, j`))
pk . Note that
cp
k
= bp
k
if and only if c = b. (6)
Hence M∗(i, j`) = M
∗(i′, j`). Summarising the above, we
have
M∗(i, j1) = M
∗(i′, j1), . . . ,M
∗(i, j`−1)
= M∗(i′, j`−1)
M∗(i, j`) = M
∗(i′, j`).
Due to Corollary 1, M∗ is a defining matrix of an ideal
secret sharing scheme. Hence M∗(i, 0) = M∗(i′, 0) and
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hence M∗∗(i, 0) = M∗∗(i′, 0). This proves that M∗∗ sat-
isfies Condition (a).
We next verify Condition (b’). Let {j1, . . . , j`} 6∈ Γ.
For any fixed K, sj1 , . . ., sj` ∈ GF (q), we consider
M∗∗(i, j1) = sj1 , . . . ,M
∗∗(i, j`)
= sj`
M∗∗(i, 0) = K. (7)
Clearly (7) is equivalent to
M∗(i, j1) = sj1 , . . . ,M
∗(i, j`−1)
= sj`−1 ,
M∗∗(i, j`) = sj`
M∗(i, 0) = K. (8)
Due to (6) there uniquely exists c ∈ GF (q) such that
cp
k
= sj` . Thus (8) is equivalent to
M∗(i, j1) = sj1 , . . . ,M
∗(i, j`−1)
= sj`−1 ,M
∗(i, j`)
= c
M∗(i, 0) = K. (9)
Since M∗ is a defining matrix of a perfect secret shar-
ing, the number of i satisfying (9) is independent of the
choice of K. Equivalently, the number of i satisfying (7)
is independent of the choice of K. We have verified Con-
dition (b’) for M∗∗. Thus we have proved that the secret
sharing scheme with defining matrixM∗∗ is perfect. Since
K = S = GF (q), this secret sharing scheme is ideal. From
the above we can conclude that the access structure of the
secret sharing scheme with the defining matrixM∗∗ is also
Γ. 2
It should be noted that, in Theorem 2, the ideal secret
sharing scheme with the defining matrix M∗∗ and the
ideal secret sharing scheme with the defining matrix M∗
have the same access structure Γ. However Γ satisfies (4)
with defining matrixM∗, while Γ may not satisfy (4) with
the defining matrix M∗∗.
Applying the same reasoning as in the proof of Theo-
rem 2 to the 0-th column of M∗, we have
Theorem 3 Let M∗ be a defining matrix of the secret
sharing scheme with the access structure Γ defined in (4).
Let k be an integer with 1 ≤ k ≤ v − 1. We replace each
entry c in the 0-th column by cp
k
. Denote the resulting
matrix by M∗∗. Then M∗∗ is a defining matrix of an ideal
secret sharing scheme with the same access structure Γ.
Using the same argument repeatedly, we have
Theorem 4 Let M∗ be a defining matrix of the secret
sharing scheme with the access structure Γ defined in (4).
For any integer r with 1 ≤ r ≤ n + 1, any integers 1 ≤
k1, . . . , kr ≤ v − 1, where q = p
v, and any integers 0 ≤
j1 < · · · < jr ≤ n, we replace each entry c in the ju-th
column by cp
ku
, u = 1, . . . , r. Denote the resulting matrix
by M∗∗. Then M∗∗ is a defining matrix of an ideal secret
sharing scheme with the same access structure Γ.
7 Limitations of Constructions
Let F be a regular mapping fromGF (q)t toGF (q)m. Due
to Theorem 1, for a given n, the number of participants,
and n+1 linear combinations h0, h1, . . . , hn of the coordi-
nate functions f1, . . . , fm of F , we can construct an ideal
secret sharing scheme with an access structure Γ, where
Γ is identified by h0, h1, . . . , hn and (4). We show that
the construction is subject to some limitations.
Lemma 7 Let F be a regular from GF (q)t to GF (q)m
(t ≥ m), n be an integer with n+1 ≤ qm−1, h0, h1, . . . , hn
be n + 1 nonzero linear combinations of the coordinate
functions f1, . . . , fm of F , and Γ be an access structure,
defined in (4). If A = {Pj1 , . . . , Pj`} is a minimal element
in Γ, then ` ≤ m.
Proof. We first prove that hj1 , . . . , hj` are linearly in-
dependent. Assume that hj1 , . . . , hj` are linearly de-
pendent. Then h0 can be linearly expressed by a basis
{hi1 , . . . , hir} of {hj1 , . . . , hj`}, where r < `. Due to (4),
{Pi1 , . . . , Pir} ∈ Γ. Note that {Pi1 , . . . , Pir} ⊂ A. This
contradicts the condition that A is a minimal element in
Γ. The contradiction proves that hj1 , . . . , hj` are linearly
independent. Recall that the rank of <F , where <F has
been defined in (3), is equal to m. Hence ` ≤ m. 2
Lemma 7 shows that a restriction on the size of minimal
elements in any access structure Γ, defined in (4).
8 Conclusions
We have shown how regular mappings from GF (q)t to
GF (q)m can be applied to construct perfect and ideal se-
cret sharing schemes. We have given a method to find all
the coordinate functions of a permutation so that we can
construct ideal secret sharing schemes from this permuta-
tion. Furthermore, from a single implementation of ideal
secret sharing scheme, we can construct other ideal secret
sharing schemes with the same access structure.
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